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Abstract 
Many scholars have drawn attention to the affective power that aspects of discourse and 
practice exert in our social and political life. Fantasy is a concept that, like structures of feeling, 
rhetoric, myth, metaphor, and utopia, has generated illuminating explanatory and 
interpretive insights with which to better understand the operation of this power. In this piece 
I argue that there are distinctive virtues in affirming the value of the category of fantasy, from 
a theoretical point of view. Importantly, however, I also argue that the qualification ‘critical’ 
in Critical Fantasy Studies captures something about how such studies can draw out the 
normative, ideological, and politico-strategic implications of psychoanalytic insights and 
observations, and thus become part of a broader enterprise in critical theoretical and 
empirical research.  
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Introduction 
Many scholars have drawn attention to the affective power coursing through social and 
political life. Fantasy is a concept that, like structures of feeling, rhetoric, myth, metaphor, 
and utopia, has generated illuminating explanatory and interpretive insights with which to 
better understand the operation of this power. It is often tempting to regard the fantasmatic 
aspects of social and political life as mere false representations of reality, but the critical 
significance of fantasy can be grasped differently. In this piece I argue that there are 
distinctive theoretical virtues in affirming the value of the psychoanalytic category of fantasy. 
Importantly, however, I also argue that the qualification ‘critical’ in Critical Fantasy Studies 
captures something about how such studies – through their appeal to post-Marxist discourse 
theory – point to the normative, ideological, and politico-strategic implications of 
psychoanalytic insights and observations, and thus become part of a broader enterprise in 
critical theoretical and empirical research.1  
 
I will first sketch out how we can understand critical fantasy studies as a frontier of post-
Marxist discourse theory, pointing briefly to some important affinities between post-Marxist 
discourse theory and critical theory, as elaborated in the Frankfurt School tradition. I also 
situate in a more precise fashion the turn to fantasy within the poststructuralist horizon of 
post-Marxist discourse theory, conceived as a species of critical political theory. I then outline 
some key features of fantasy with reference to adjacent notions, particularly enjoyment. I do 
this in order to underline the insights made possible by a psychoanalytic understanding of this 
category, moving on to consider the critical aspects of Critical Fantasy Studies. In my 
discussion of each of the conceptual and critical dimensions of critical fantasy studies, I 
outline a set of challenges confronting discourse theory, pointing to possible avenues of 
future research. I conclude with a caveat designed to guard against the perils of a kind of 
psychoanalytic imperialism that would emphasize the fantasmatic dimension of life at the 
expense of, rather than as a supplement to, other dimensions of social and political life, 
indicating how this brings into view a broad comparative, transdisciplinary research agenda. 
 
Critical Fantasy Studies as a frontier of post-Marxist discourse theory 
Few would deny the considerable impact the Frankfurt School’s use of Marx and Freud has 
had on our thinking about critique and empirical research in the humanities and social 
sciences. The increased attention paid to right-wing economic and nationalist rhetoric since 
the global financial crash, not to mention the so-called ‘populist moment’, marks yet another 
conjuncture calling for a return to the Frankfurt School classics in order to re-tarry with 
chestnut issues of a theoretical, methodological, and critical character, concerning 
authoritarianism and fascism, monopoly capitalism, anti-Semitism, consumerism, and 
 
1 As far as I am aware the term ‘critical fantasy studies’ appeared for the first time at the 2012 conference of 
the Association for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, in the context of a series of panels eliciting 
psycho-social perspectives on the effects of neoliberalism and the hatred of government, organized by Lynne 
Layton, whose own work shares strong affinities with such an endeavour (see Layton 2020). 
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positivist understandings of theory/praxis and subjectivity/objectivity relations (Morelock 
2018; Best et al. 2018).  
 
Since the (early) Frankfurt School burst on the scene with its unique mix of Freudian and 
Marxian thought, there have been many efforts to mine the rich terrain defined by the 
intersection of psychoanalysis and the critique of political economy, for example by taking 
into account structuralist, poststructuralist, deconstructionist and post-Freudian 
interventions. Post-Marxist discourse theory instantiates one such iteration, as it also seeks 
to articulate a critique of traditional Marxism with psychoanalytic insights, pushing this 
however in the direction of a critical political theory set within a poststructuralist framework. 
Critical fantasy studies can thus be understood as a means of amplifying one particular 
frontier of post-Marxism, at the cross-roads of poststructuralist discourse analysis and 
psychoanalysis. The importance of such cross-fertilization for post-Marxist discourse theory 
is something that Laclau and Mouffe have themselves emphasized (Laclau and Moufffe 1985; 
Laclau 1990), but its significance has also been registered and reinforced by other scholars, 
such as Zizek (1989) and Stavrakakis (1999), provoking an increasing number of related 
scholarly outputs, including panels organized under the auspices of numerous discourse 
theory conferences over the last decade or so. 
 
Psychoanalysis is attractive to both post-Marxist discourse theorists and early Frankfurt 
School critical theorists because it offers a vocabulary within which to understand how 
structures that appear to be ‘out there’ – structures of economy, biological sex, race, etc. – 
can come to inhabit us, making them feel personal, intimate, and natural. In this view, 
processes of identification, transference, introjection, and projection, among others, 
elucidate how the family, the school, the media, and so on, mediate between regimes of 
production (or consumption, sex, race, etc.) and the construction of our selves. However, one 
notable difference in the two approaches comes from the emphasis post-Marxists attribute 
to the ‘linguistic turn’, at least as inflected through Derridean deconstruction and Lacanian 
psychoanalysis. Frankfurt School theorists were of course highly sensitive to the rhetorical 
function of language, including how ideological meanings were transmitted and reinforced 
through the culture industry, but one effect of making the role of language and theories of 
discourse an explicit component of the post-Marxist enterprise has been to make it easier to 
see and explore affinities with other types of discourse analysis, such as conversational 
analysis, discursive psychology, critical discourse analysis, Foucauldian discourse analyses, 
rhetorical political analysis, and so on. 
 
Why should discourse analysts, rightly sensitized to the role of language in understanding the 
process of meaning-making, be interested in what psychoanalysis has to offer? In a first 
approach one can understand the psychoanalytic contribution in terms of a distinction 
between two sorts of meaning, in order to then explore how one (deeper meaning) shapes 
the other (conscious meaning). Although it tends to eschew psychoanalytic terminology, 
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cognitive (or conceptual) metaphor theory adopts just such an explanatory frame (Lakoff and 
Johnson 1980). For example, it might explain voting patterns (conservative versus liberal) with 
reference to the dominant family metaphor informing voter household dynamics 
(authoritarian versus permissive, respectively). While there is something to be said about this 
approach, some scholars caution against a tendency to see these ‘deep’ metaphors 
predominantly in neuro-cognitive terms that underplay the unconscious dynamics animating 
the production, sustenance, or transformation of discourse and thought (Caspi 2018). But 
approaches that emphasize the emotional aspects of social and political life can – somewhat 
paradoxically at first sight – also close off from view the unconscious dynamics at play. Hence, 
in contrast to psychological approaches that identify and catalogue emotional dispositions, 
treating them as reified mechanisms to explain social and political behaviour, 
psychoanalytically-informed discursive psychologists highlight the contextual dynamics that 
constitute emotions (Parker 2010; Billig 1997). From a psychoanalytic point of view, then, 
feelings can be just as ideological as strongly held beliefs and so it becomes incumbent upon 
the discourse analyst to also identify the psycho-dynamics by which they are constructed and 
sustained. So while it is true that Lacanian psychoanalysis and discourse analysis share 
common cause in the central importance they attribute to language and linguistics, 
psychoanalysis supplements this appeal to language with an appeal to the dynamics of 
intersubjective engagement and investment. Critical fantasy studies suggests that a turn to 
the category of fantasy offers a way to make this double appeal palpable, and in doing so 
delineates a frontier in post-Marxist discourse theory with considerable research potential.  
 
Fantasy and/in Post-Marxist Discourse Theory 
 
The articulation of psychoanalysis and discourse analysis through fantasy can be appreciated  
with reference to the axiomatic assumptions of Laclau and Mouffe’s post-Marxist discourse 
theory. For a start such a poststructuralist framework assumes that structured fields of 
meaning called discourses constitute a fundamental starting point for any adequate 
understanding of practices and institutions, including the subjects, objects, and identities 
making them up. However, an absolutely crucial supplementary assumption informing this 
approach suggests that such discourses are also marked by contingency. This is often qualified 
as ‘radical’ contingency because it is understood to ‘go all the way down’, an idea that 
resonates with several categorial names that point to similar theoretical intuitions, such as 
undecidability (Derrida), dislocation (Laclau), excess (Deleuze and Guattari), and lack in the 
Other (Lacan). 
 
Radical contingency is understood to ‘go all the way down’ because it captures something 
fundamental about how our symbolic system is constitutively incomplete. It is not simply the 
case that ‘things could be otherwise’, though this will do as a first approximation. It is also not 
just that we cannot account for something within the context of an existing symbolic schema 
due to the complexity or abundance of the world. Rather, ‘radical contingency’ captures 
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something about the incompleteness of the symbolic universe itself. What a (Lacanian) 
psychoanalytic perspective adds to this picture is the insistence that this constitutive 
incompleteness also marks the subject. In other words, Lacan draws our attention to the way 
the openness of the system of meaning is registered in the subject’s experience, as anxiety 
for example. And this, in turn, enables us to directly articulate this constitutive 
incompleteness, this ‘lack in the Other’, with fantasy, enjoyment, and desire, bringing us a 
step closer to addressing questions of affect and passion.  
 
Fantasy is thus a category that enables us to thematize key debates and tensions in discourse 
theory around the role that affect, passion, and matter can play in their relation to political 
struggles and questions of method and critique. Chantal Mouffe and Yannis Stavrakakis, 
among others, have repeatedly emphasized the importance of making passion and affect 
central to our political analyses and our deliberations about hegemony and political strategy 
(Mouffe 1993, 115; Stavrakakis 2009). Similarly, Ernesto Laclau insists that “something 
belonging to the order of affect has a primary role in discursively constructing the social” 
(Laclau 2004, 326).  
 
However, this does not by any means imply there is a consensus about how to conceptually 
grasp the relationship between affect and discourse (see, for example, Glynos and Stavrakakis 
2004; Laclau 2004; Laclau 2010). In fact, the significance of fantasy for discourse theory lies 
precisely in the idea that while it remains part of discourse, its habitat stretches to the limits 
of discourse. Critical fantasy studies can thus be conceived as a frontier of post-Marxist 
discourse theory that seeks to promote greater attention to conceptual, critical, and 
methodological issues pertaining to the question of discursive limits, giving a new lease of life 
to the spirit of the early Frankfurt School and similar enterprises. In fact, a helpful framework 
within which to situate this ambition of Critical Fantasy Studies resides in the so-called ‘logics 
approach’, developed within the auspices of the Essex School in Discourse Theory (Glynos and 
Howarth 2007), where the logic of fantasy is explicitly added as an analytically separate logic, 
sitting alongside the social and political logics appearing in the work of Laclau and Mouffe. 
Yet, aspects of discourse theory at the juncture of psychoanalysis and discourse analysis still 
remain underdeveloped. As some of the methodological challenges and opportunities 
associated with taking fantasy seriously have already been sketched out elsewhere (Glynos 
et al. 2019; Lapping & Glynos 2019; Glynos 2011, 2010), in what follows I focus primarily on 
the theoretical and critical dimensions of Critical Fantasy Studies, conceived as a frontier of 
post-Marxist discourse theory. 
 
Questions of Theory: Fantasy & Enjoyment 
One key insight animating the turn to critical fantasy studies obviously has something to do 
with the concept of fantasy itself. “There is no way of understanding political identities and 
destinies without letting fantasy into the frame” claims the literary theorist, historian, and 
political thinker Jacqueline Rose (1996, 4). An appeal to fantasy is attractive to critical political 
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theorists for several reasons, not least because it enables us to reconfigure our understanding 
of ideology in a way that does not make falsehood a requirement of its application, nor in a 
way that identifies it as a particular constellation of ideas, however important this latter 
aspect of ideology is and should remain. 
 
What a psychoanalytic understanding of fantasy tries to capture is the idea of overinvestment 
or enjoyment. I will expand briefly on this idea shortly, but for now it is worth noting that this 
idea is attractive from the point of view of critical political theory because it speaks directly 
to the way we are gripped by certain norms and ideas and identities, but also because it taps 
into a related network of concepts for thinking about problems of reform and transformation 
– whether social, economic, or political. It can speak to issues linked to resistance to change 
and transformation, just as much as issues linked to our ready embrace of change and 
transformation. Each can be looked at fruitfully through the filter of fantasy and enjoyment 
because they offer ways of drawing out insights linked to the unconscious, especially as 
regards dynamic understandings of the unconscious. Issues concerning resistance to change, 
or its opposite, the embrace of change, thus carve out an abstract problem domain that 
notions of fantasy and enjoyment can help us navigate in a productive manner. For example, 
this conceptual framework allows us to tackle questions in and around ideology, something 
that the work of a (growing) number of scholars have been at pains to draw out (Zizek 1989; 
Stavrakakis 1999). 
 
A relatively straightforward way to see how these concepts can have a bearing on questions 
of ideology is to refer to the now commonplace cliché that appeals to the ‘facts of the matter’ 
only go so far in the game of persuasion. This is a point brought into sharp relief in a context 
in which we regularly confront claims about ‘alternative facts’, or when we casually hurl the 
term ‘fake news’ at people whose views we don’t share, or when we affirm that we are living 
in a ‘post-truth’ era. From a psychoanalytic point of view, that which escapes ‘facts of the 
matter’, as well as allied expressions like ‘rational self-interest’, can be approached in many 
ways. Fantasy is obviously one of those ways and, as noted earlier, enjoyment is particularly 
relevant here, at least as this term is understood by the French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan. 
According to him enjoyment is not reducible to pleasure, since it is also often associated with 
a kind of pleasure-in-pain that is closely intertwined with desire and drive. Lacan used the 
concept of jouissance to capture this idea, and in one of his more colourful formulations he 
states that on the path of jouissance “once you have started, you never know where it will 
end. It begins with a tickle and ends in a blaze of petrol” (Lacan 2007, 72). From this point of 
view, perhaps we could say that fantasy is the frame within which the attractions and threats 
of enjoyment become legible for the subject. 
 
Everyday understandings of fantasy of course tend to oppose it to reality and the ‘facts of the 
matter’. However, one of the most intriguing insights that psychoanalysis brings to bear on 
debates about ideology is the idea that fantasy is precisely not opposed to reality or ‘facts of 
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the matter’, at least not necessarily so. What is important from the point of view of fantasy is 
that it is aligned with desire, not that it opposes some notion of representational truth. 
Ideology and representational truth certainly intersect, but they do so in the way that vectors 
intersect on a plane: they intersect, but without necessarily pointing in opposite directions. 
This psychoanalytic insight with respect to ideology can be brought out neatly by juxtaposing 
two claims: 
 
1. A statement may be no more ideological for being false 
2. A statement may be no less ideological for being true 
 
One way of starting to unpack these statements is to point out how the false character of a 
claim is not in itself sufficient to elevate it to the level of desire or enjoyment. In other words, 
just because a statement is false, this does not mean it is also ideological. For example, 
executive officers may falsely insist that their company’s financial accounts have not been 
‘massaged’ to boost its shareholder value (as Jeffrey Skilling and Kenneth Lay did in the 
heydays of Enron), but a lot more work would be required to show that these false claims and 
accompanying deceitful practices are also caught up in circuits of desire and enjoyment. 
 
But we can go a step further: not only is the falsity of a claim not sufficient to transform a 
statement into a statement about enjoyment and thus ideology, it is also not necessary. In 
fact, a statement may be no less ideological for being true. Or to put it in more straightforward 
terms: a statement may be thoroughly ideological while at the same time being true, in the 
sense of representing reality faithfully. This is the take-away insight that underpins Lacan’s 
claim that just because his or her partner is found to be having an affair as a ‘matter of fact’ 
this does not mean that a person’s jealousy cannot still be treated as pathological (see Zizek 
1989, 48). Or to take another example, while it may very well be true as a ‘matter of fact’ that 
the LGBTQ+ community demands ‘more and more’ rights in ‘more and more’ domains  (e.g., 
employment rights, church governance rights, marriage rights, property rights, and so on), 
this does not mean that such a statement – as articulated by right-wing agitators – is innocent, 
since it is not uncommon for it to be delivered in a way that attributes to the LGBTQ+ 
community an excessive impulse that can be readily presented and experienced as 
threatening. What makes something appear invested with enjoyment – and in this sense 
ideological – is not linked to the issue of whether it conforms to a notion of representational 
truth (i.e., whether it corresponds to a consensus reality) so much as how it is caught up in a 
fantasmatic narrative governed by a logic of desire. From a psychoanalytic point of view, then, 
ideology is linked to a subject’s fantasmatic investment in an idea or practice, not its 
epistemological status as false. 
 
Another way to unpack the theoretical significance of the idea of fantasmatic investment is 
through an appeal to the further psychoanalytic insight that what binds a community together 
is often not simply an identification with a common ideal like 'justice' or ‘freedom’, but also 
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an identification with a common form of transgression; and in particular the fantasmatic 
enjoyment derived from this transgression – an enjoyment often supported with reference to 
a readily available alibi. Consider for example the great thrill experienced at witnessing 
politically correct liberals being flummoxed. We can refer here to one of William Connolly’s 
astute observations about the role the SUV played in George W. Bush’s 2004 presidential 
campaign. The SUV served literally and metaphorically as a vehicle that carried a message 
designed to poke fun at the politically correct establishment and also to capture something 
about this process of enjoyment in transgression. After Bush’s entourage sped around a 
NASCAR track attended by tens of thousands of fans 
 
Bush emerged from the only SUV in the entourage to an incredible roar of approval. 
The crowd responded to the SUV as a symbol of disdain for womanly ecologists, safety 
advocates,… worry-warts about global warming, weak-willed pluralists, and supporters 
of international accords such as the Kyoto Treaty. Bush played upon the symbol and 
drew energy from the crowd's acclamation of it. But [and this is the moment of the 
‘alibi’] his handlers could say – [when] asked – that "he just happened" to ride in that 
vehicle, sending a surge of joy through followers who both love the message and the 
way it flummoxes critical commentators. (Connolly 2008: 54-5) 
 
Related to this enjoyment is the sort of enjoyment associated with what we could call bare 
faced mega lies as a particularly dramatic species of false news, alternative facts and 
conspiracy theories in a post-truth era. Consider Trump’s claims about attendance figures at 
his inaugural speech, to which one could add examples almost ad infinitum, such as dogmatic 
climate sceptic claims, or claims that the earth is in fact flat, or claims that the moon landing 
is a hoax, or claims by Bolsonaro that the Amazon fires were initiated by environmental 
activists and NGOs. In line with the observations made earlier, what is important about such 
claims from a psychoanalytic point of view is not so much that these are false, so much as the 
way they serve to mobilize desire and forge identities. What such claims do, ultimately, is 
bamboozle a liberal elite wedded to the sanctity of objective facts and figures and rationality. 
This is not to deny that these claims often distract us from what is ‘really going on’; indeed, 
identifying the strategic or tactical aspects of bare faced mega lies are indispensable to their 
critical analysis. A psychoanalytic perspective simply insists that what is at stake is also the 
dynamic construction and sustenance of a collective identity that leans heavily on viscerally 
potent affective registers (see also Connolly 2017: 29-30). What brings people together is, in 
part, a collective form of enjoyment whose source resides in liberal elites being flummoxed 
and at a loss about how on earth to respond, since these claims defy the senses and transgress 
established common sense in such a spectacular way. 
 
What is particularly noteworthy regarding such bare faced mega lies, not to mention their 
proliferation and ‘stickiness’, is that we appear to have less a transgression of any one 
particular truth than an attack on the conditions of possibility of setting up a truth regime in 
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the first place. Or if we insist on calling it a transgression, it appears to be of a rather 
fundamental sort. It is not so much about transgressing a boundary, as it is about attacking 
the very idea of a boundary. And this is truly horrifying, because it literally takes the feet away 
from under us: what appears to be at stake are the very rules that make possible the 
production of credible statements – whether cashed out in moral terms (as in the case of PC 
wars) or in epistemological terms (regarding knowledge claims about climate change for 
example). The target of such attacks, in other words, is not so much what is being said so 
much as what lends authority to what is being said. When, for example, the subject position 
of a professional politician or a climate scientist is disqualified in advance, one becomes 
entirely indifferent to the statements being uttered by such a figure. It could be argued that 
the subject positions of Hilary Clinton and the liberal mainstream media as a whole were 
discredited in advance by Trump’s supporters in just this way during the 2016 US presidential 
campaign, accounting for Teflon Trump’s capacity to weather otherwise cataclysmic criticisms 
of all sorts. Still, what is important from a psychoanalytic point of view is how such norm 
transgressions – some more fundamental than others – can provoke fantasmatic enjoyments 
that create and sustain forms of collective identification which, under certain conditions, can 
also foster and sustain rather extreme forms of polarization. 
 
So the term ‘fantasy’ in Critical Fantasy Studies signals that what is at stake in such studies is 
a more systematic attempt to foreground and explore what exactly psychoanalytic thought 
brings to bear on issues connected to claims about reality, morality, rationality, and other 
‘facts of the matter’. Here, fantasy – and associated psychoanalytic concepts and insights – 
simply serves as a potentially productive entry point for such studies (see, for example, 
Ormrod 2014). And this in turn opens up an interesting research pathway, calling for a 
theoretical and speculative comparative inquiry into how fantasy and other psychoanalytic 
categories can produce revealing insights when juxtaposed to, and contrasted with, other key 
categories drawing on other traditions: reification, fetishism, structures of feeling, rhetoric, 
myth, narrative, metaphor, utopia, and so on. Rhetoric, to take just one example, appears to 
be a promising concept for such a comparative exploration, particularly as elaborated by 
scholars such as Alan Finlayson (2012) and James Martin (2014; 2016). At least two features 
of their work are worth commenting on. First, their brand of ‘rhetorical political analysis’ 
already constitutes a reactivation and deconstruction of classical rhetorical categories, 
rearticulating them in a way that is compatible with basic poststructuralist presuppositions 
and thus directly pertinent for post-Marxist discourse theory scholars. In addition, however, 
recent work has suggested conceptualizing rhetorical persuasion also as a way of ‘capturing 
desire’ (Martin 2016). This opens up a terrain rich for further comparative-conceptual 
investigation within the field of critical fantasy studies. 
 
Questions of Critique: Normative and Ideological Critique 
So far I have focused on the theoretical and conceptual aspects of critical fantasy studies. 
What about the critical aspects? The explicit invocation of the term ‘critical’ already indicates 
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that engaging in fantasy studies should matter from a critical point of view. So it is important 
to be precise about what this entails. The idea of critique here is understood both 
normatively, in terms of the kind of concrete programs that might be promoted by certain 
sets of practices, and ideologically, at least in its psychoanalytic sense, as understood by 
scholars such as Laclau, Mouffe, and Zizek. The qualifier ‘normative’ is here meant to refer 
broadly to the norms, ideals, principles or policies associated with one or another social, 
economic, or political programme; and it tends to presuppose one or another theory of 
society, broadly conceived. The qualifier ‘ideological’, however, is not reducible to ideas or 
ideational content, in the way we refer to conservatism, liberalism, socialism, or nationalism 
as ideologies. As I noted earlier, the invocation of the term ideology is aiming to capture 
something not simply about ideas or norms but about the fantasmatically-inflected way we 
engage with them, the way we are invested in them emotionally, the way we identify with 
them. 
 
From an ideological point of view – rather than simply from a normative point of view – a 
movement, party, or discourse can therefore be linked to different forms of affective 
investment, depending on how the subject mediates the content of that discourse with one 
or another fantasy: fantasies of racial or ethnic purity, nostalgic fantasies of past glory, 
fantasies of mastery or self-sufficiency, fantasies of a Caring Other, and so on. Do we engage 
with this content in open ways that affirm their uncertain character and that acknowledge 
our anxieties and doubts, or in ways that can be characterised as ‘closed’, rooted in 
ressentiment, hatred, fear, and threats projected onto others?  
 
The widely reported MPs’ expenses scandal in 2009 can serve to illustrate this difference 
between the normative content associated with fantasy and the ideological mode of 
fantasmatic investment in this content (Chang and Glynos 2011). The scandal centred on the 
uproar provoked by the abuse visited upon the expenses system by British MPs over many 
years. At the level of content, it is possible to show how collective fantasies of ‘individual self-
sufficiency’ and ‘paternalism’ point to distinct normative visions of a future polity in response 
to the scandal: the elimination or reduction of state expenditure and public services; or, on 
the contrary, the reform of, and increased support for, the state apparatus and public 
services. However, beyond this difference in normative content, it was also possible to discern 
a common mode of fantasmatic ressentiment, undergirded by a shared over-investment in 
nostalgic ideas of past honour and glory, understood to be pure and under imminent threat 
of corruption, whether from the inside or the outside. 
 
In fact, this type of analysis raises a more general question about ideological critique itself, as 
opposed to normative critique. If we accept that effective forms of ideological critique cannot 
always or so easily rely on appeals to common empirical or moral sense; if we accept that the 
descriptive and normative aspects of critique cannot and should not be understood to 
exhaust its purview; if we accept the need for a conception of ideology that takes seriously 
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the fantasmatic dimension of social and political life, we can then ask: What are the conditions 
under which we can imagine a form of critique that would transform our relation to 
(fantasmatically-mediated) modes of over-investment, particularly those broadly understood 
to belong to the family of ressentiment? 
 
In addressing this question it is worth turning to another psychoanalytic category - the 
category of mourning – in part because it can be readily be brought into a productive relation 
with fantasy (see also Butler 2006; Glynos 2014). To understand why an appeal to mourning 
might be promising in this context it is worth emphasizing how the force of our attachment 
to others, and what often makes mourning their loss so difficult, is linked not so much to the 
specific content of a mediating fantasy as it is to the fact that this content and its significance 
tend to resist disclosure. Fantasy’s natural habitat is ‘between the lines’, so to speak, and so 
the way someone matters to us can thus often appear rather opaque. The paradox of fantasy 
is that it tends to dwell somewhere beyond our conscious deliberations and thoughts, always 
just out of reach, and yet it also appears to be absolutely central in defining who we are. A 
key critical insight of psychoanalysis, however, suggests that the ‘grip’ of a fantasmatic 
narrative tends to lose its force when it becomes articulated as a (fantasmatic) narrative. It is 
for this reason that the integration of the concept of mourning into a critical fantasy studies 
enterprise appears promising. 
 
In a first approach we could say that an appeal to mourning is helpful in thinking about the 
process of detachment as a process of fantasy construction. Mourning implies the loss of 
something that is significant to us, often linked to a person we love. In other words, it 
addresses a problem about the loss of our identity support. But, as noted, the meaning and 
significance of this loss can often elude us, even as this loss is and remains deeply felt. 
Mourning, therefore, entails a process of construction since, by means of slowly building up 
a narrative, we can begin to make some sense of this loss, and in doing so start the process 
of (creative and constructive) detachment from our identity (over-)investments, our modes 
of enjoyment and their fantasmatic support. From the perspective of political theory, 
mourning can thus be readily understood as a component part of a critique of ideology (see 
also Glynos & Voutyras 2016). In the case of the MPs’ expenses scandal referred to above, 
this might demand some level of creative experimentation with collective spaces of 
deliberation in which it would be possible to entertain troubling ideas without immediately 
suppressing them or projecting them onto others – for example, the idea that our historical 
and democratic legacy was never as pure as we imagined it, or that it is rather inconsistent 
and incomplete, inviting collective efforts at re-imagining and constructing alternative 
futures. It might turn out that experimental spaces of radical democratic deliberation – 
construed broadly enough to incorporate the dimension of mourning and thus processes of 
collective fantasmatic construction – would be particularly appropriate in situations of 
extreme political polarization, but I suspect that it would be relevant also in less polarized 
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contexts, whether at a macro-political level or at a more quotidian level, connected to the 
household or the workplace, for example. 
 
However, an appeal to mourning, understood now also as ideological critique, also provokes 
a set of more targeted questions, which I can only briefly touch on here, about the conditions 
under which it can take place. Setting aside admittedly important educational and 
pedagogical pre-conditions, we can – in Gramscian fashion – explore these questions in 
relation to state-specific sites as well as civil society sites, involving, for example, the 
construction of monuments, sculptures, or other forms of public art and cultural artefacts. 
Moreover, these questions about mourning’s conditions of possibility, which carry both 
normative and ideological significance, are as pertinent for dealing with the collective 
fantasies undergirding our social and political identities, ideals, and discourses as they are for 
dealing with individual fantasies. 
 
In sum, the qualification ‘critical’ in Critical Fantasy Studies is meant to capture something 
about how such studies seek to draw out the normative, ideological, and politico-strategic 
implications of specific psychoanalytic insights and observations, and thus become part of a 
broader enterprise in critical empirical and theoretical research. However, this is just the 
beginning of the sorts of issues a critical fantasy approach might try to thematize, because, it 
is precisely at this point that things start to get messy.  
 
Concluding Caveat: Not all that is not conscious is unconscious 
My final, concluding set of comments can be seen as a kind of cautionary remark, or rather 
an attempt to inject some modesty into any sort of critical fantasy studies endeavour. This is 
because a psychoanalytic characterization of phenomena may lead us to exaggerate the role 
of affect and unconscious enjoyment in accounting for both the fascination and inertia of such 
phenomena. It may suggest that a critical explanation of, for example, the Trump, anti-Trump, 
Brexit or anti-Brexit phenomena, can be entirely – or predominantly – understood in terms 
of the culturally-inflected fantasies that make such enjoyments possible. We need to guard 
against this kind of psychoanalytic imperialism, akin to a kind of economic imperialism, 
whereby a particular economic category like class becomes a substantive first cause, rather 
than a highly productive entry point. Perhaps we can summarize these cautionary 
observations in the expression “NOT ALL THAT IS NOT CONSCIOUS IS UNCONSCIOUS”. 
 
This phrase expresses the idea that not all that is not subject to conscious cognitive 
apprehension and rational control can or should necessarily be understood with reference to 
the Freudian unconscious. In many ways this may seem like stating the obvious. Affirming this 
idea, however, does not simply serve to inoculate us against temptations of aggrandizement. 
It also implies affirming the challenge to tackle the rather tricky question of how to 
incorporate other factors into our account, including non-conscious factors that are non-
unconscious; what relative ‘weights’ to attribute to them; how to conceptualise their inter-
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relationships; how to articulate them; and so on. If not all that is not subject to conscious 
individual or collective control is reducible to unconscious processes, a critical fantasy studies 
approach must be ready to engage with and combine prima facie heterogeneous factors – 
often the focus of distinct disciplines – such as coercion (physical, financial, mental), 
institutional norms, social and political logics, competing normative values, causal 
mechanisms, fantasmatic enjoyment, and so on. 
 
There are thus a wide range of phenomena and issues on which critical fantasy studies could 
be brought to bear, which can be organized illustratively, though somewhat arbitrarily and 
not unproblematically, into a number of domains: the domain of the economy (concerning 
processes of production, competition, exchange, consumption, as well as the expropriation 
and distribution of surplus labour); the domain of politics and governance (concerning 
different forms of organization centred around questions of justice, democracy, and 
hegemony, whether party-political in character or oriented toward community organizing 
and grass-roots mobilisation); the domain of nature (concerning the inanimate physical world 
and the living world, incorporating issues linked to climate change and the sexed body, for 
example); the domain of society (concerning the domestic and work spheres, the cultural and 
media spheres, the spheres of arts and education, as well as prefigurative forms of 
experimental living); the domain of methodology (concerning research processes not just in 
an academic context, but also in policy and wider civil society contexts). One can imagine such 
a transdisciplinary research endeavour taking place in dialogue with other approaches, 
spanning the full gamut from those that share clear affinities with the critical explanatory 
impulse of post-Marxist discourse theory all the way to those approaches that abide by the 
more conventional explanatory imperatives of social science. Given the early Frankfurt 
School’s rich heritage of engaging with many of these issue domains, and given its effort to 
think through and carefully navigate the relationship between psychoanalysis, social science, 
culture, and the critique of political economy, I suspect that a lot can be gained by making a 
more systematic effort to bring work informed by this perspective more fully into the orbit of 
post-Marxist discourse theory. Critical fantasy studies can serve as one way to further explore 
and deepen this relationship, while reaching out to other approaches as well, inspiring new 
takes on the relationship between the unconscious and non-unconscious dimensions of social 
and political life. 
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